Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War insurgencies have come to occupy the centre stage of violent conflicts in Africa and have turned into a critical element of rapid social change in most of the continent's sub-regions. This is particularly true for Central Africa which has become the most insurgency-affected region of the continent ever Aside from the quantitative expansion of the phenomenon, the significance of insurrections is also noteworthy on the qualitative level. For one thing, vast stretches displaced by insurgents or were forced to share power with their rebel foes.
The steady recurrence of insurgencies in a number of countries across the continent as well as their increasingly frequent inclusion into governments thus seem to indicate that would-be leaders have some reason to conceptualise the organisation of violence as a viable path to occupy at least parcels of state power. Taking this assumption as a starting point, the present paper aims at exploring the underlying factors that contribute to the proliferation of insurgencies as well as their often successful outcomes -success being defined as the taking of state power or parts thereof. Rather than analysing the root causes of rebellion, we propose to probe contextual factors that bear on the rationale of politically ambitious would-be leaders to start insurgency warfare.
To date, careful analysis of the significance of the insurgency phenomenon has been an exception.
1 Arguably, this is to some extent due to the deeply rooted tradition of state-centred analysis in political science and its sub-disciplines. 2 Unsurprisingly, then, the weakening of state capabilities has been identified as a major explanatory factor of high levels of internal conflict and insurrections in Africa. resources as a facilitating factor helping to set up and sustain insurgencies. 4 While both factors are important, we argue that an analysis of insurgency-related conflicts in Africa is incomplete without taking into consideration external factors which relate to shifts in the post-1989 international environment, the way outside actors seek to solve violent conflict in Africa and the impact these changes have on the calculus of wouldbe leaders to organise insurgencies.
Our argument is straightforward: over the past fifteen years, power-sharing agreements between embattled incumbents and insurgents have emerged as the West's preferred instrument of peace-making in Africa. In almost every country in which insurgent leaders mustered sufficient military power to attract the attention of foreign states, insurgents were included into 'governments of national unity'. We argue that the institutionalisation of this practice demonstrates Western willingness to provide political pay-offs for insurgent violence and hereby creates incentive structures which turn the rebel path into an appealing option in the pursuit of otherwise blocked political aspirations. If valid, this hypothesis should have important implications for the policies of Western governments toward Africa and their stated objective of conflict prevention.
The paper is organised as follows: In the first section, we will briefly sketch the trajectory of the biggest insurgency movement of the Congo War, the RCD, which will illustrate that the current debate on greed and grievances neglects the extent to which the strategies of insurgencies are significantly shaped by the international environment and strategies of extraversion. Section two addresses the political inconsistencies of Western political engagement in Africa. We will argue that parts of the profound political malaise on much of the continent stem from the ambiguous stance that the West has adopted in regard to both democracy assistance and conflict resolution. We will examine the extent to which these policies have contributed to the creation of contexts which are conducive to ever more violent politics on the continent. As we will analyse in the third section, these inconsistencies have pushed some African countries into a vicious cycle that corroborates the reproduction of insurgency-induced violence. We will develop the hypothesis according to which the West's preferred instrument of conflict resolution, i.e. power-sharing agreements, turns its purpose of conflict resolution as much as the rhetoric of conflict prevention on its head in that it inadvertently encourages would-be leaders elsewhere to embark on the insurgency path. Finally, in the conclusion, we will attempt to formulate policy prescriptions that may help to overcome the dilemma between conflict resolution and conflict prevention.
The Case of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD)
In spite of military support by Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe, the government of President Laurent Kabila government proved unable to squash the rebellion of the Rwandan-backed RCD that began in August 1998. A year later, significant pressure from regional and Western governments resulted in the Lusaka agreement which foresaw the holding of a national dialogue whose envisaged outcome was a 'new political order' for the Congo. 5 After significant delays, and the emergence of further rebellions, the dialogue was finally concluded in late 2002. In accordance with its raison d'être, the forum resulted in a comprehensive power-sharing formula which provided the RCD with one of the four Vice-Presidencies as well as numerous other government posts. In the remainder of this section, we will offer a broad sketch of the RCD rebellion, leadership and objectives and its interplay with the international arena.
For a start, it seems important to point out the difficulties arising from attempts to categorize the RCD in accordance with motives of ideology or greed. In regard to ideology, for example, the RCD leadership was far too heterogeneous to patch together a coherent political programme. suspended development aid, initial Western support for the democracy movement faltered the longer the domestic power struggle endured.
Generally, strict enforcement of political conditionality remained the exception.
Throughout the 1990s, this was evidenced by the fact that the evolution of aid levels of individual African countries did not allow to predict their system of government.
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Some governments such as France's clients in Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Cameroon were even rewarded for their democratic recalcitrance with sharply increased bilateral aid in the early 1990s. 27 What is more, reform-minded states received scarce payoffs for undertaking comparatively extensive democratic engineering and the quality of democratic governance had no measurable impact on aid levels. 28 As such, the paradigm of political conditionality that many Western countries embraced as a determinant factor of aid allocation was more rhetorical than actual.
Ultimately, the battle field for international 'presentability' of African regimes proved to be the field of electoral politics that Western donors turned into the ultimate yardstick of democratic governance. However, the heavy dominance of the executive and the often pervasive blending of state and ruling party generally prevented progress with regard to the overall freedom of political choice in many African countries. At the same time, Western actors revealed a strong unwillingness or inability to tackle these deeply ingrained patterns of political behaviour and the concomitant fraudulent electioneering. 29 As a consequence, past and present incumbents find it fairly easy to satisfy demands for more appropriate electoral forces and only a late and half-hearted military reaction by the French military which, however, saved the Gbagbo regime. It was only in the aftermath that the regime expanded its military capabilities substantially -again at a highly problematic pace and by very suspect means. On balance, the long-lasting but declining military tutelage by an outside force proved to be detrimental to a peaceful settlement of the crisis which had arguably been prepared by France's ambivalent political role in the country throughout the 1990s. consequentiality. This re-active behaviour has typically taken the form of powersharing agreements between embattled governments and insurgencies. To date, the record of power-sharing agreements appears to be mixed at best, not least because international mediators had to make the painstaking experience that their job is all but finished with the signing ceremony of peace accords. 46 This paper cannot offer a critical survey of the effectiveness of internationally brokered power-sharing agreements. Rather, it seeks to outline some of the fallacies and unintended consequences that characterise the generalized approach of power-sharing. We will 44 This is particularly obvious in regard to war-torn countries where outsiders' attempts to solve conflict through power-sharing require -by definition -the recognition of all the warring parties, including the insurgents. Thus, it entails a major shift in the domestic balance of power since external actors level the political playing field in favour of insurgents at the expense of state leaders:
'Instead of regarding one party as representing the state, and the others as opposing it, external mediators came to conceive all the parties as subsisting on a more or less equal footing; their function in turn was no longer to protect those who could claim (…) to represent the state, but rather to achieve a political settlement through recognition of all the competing parties.' What is more, the containment approach focusing on the warring parties put civilian opposition parties into an uneasy position: irrespective of their participation in negotiations, they were either forced to take a pro-government position (and were dealt with as a negligible partner) or a pro-rebellion position (and exposing themselves to all sorts of accusations). 50 From the perspective of the West, the only way to overcome the conundrum of limited interests and the urge 'to do something' was a low key engagement whose logic rested on de facto recognition of insurgents as legitimate 'stakeholders' of domestic power struggles. As long as they are sufficiently powerful in military terms, insurgencies can neither be neglected nor marginalized.
Regardless of their often appalling human rights record, their factual power warrants international consideration.
Perhaps the best known and most appalling case, the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone were Should the hypothesis on the interplay between external incentives and the rise of insurgencies be valid, it reflects a troubling political development that bodes ill for the prevention of conflicts in Africa. It seems to underwrite the marginalisation of civilian politics and the growing militarization of politics, whereby the recourse to violence holds political promises which are even internationally endorsed in the guise of power-sharing agreements.
Beyond the demonstration effects individual cases do set for would-be leaders in other countries, it is also questionable whether power-sharing agreements are truly conducive to the establishment of peace inside of war-torn countries. First, many rebel leaders behave in office much as in wartime (i.e. Sankoh, Taylor), effectively forestalling any chance to return to some degree of normality or even a perspective of development; second, some agreements are so complicated that they effectively defy implementation. Without significant and long-term external backing, these agreements are bound to collapse and ignite a return to war; third, the notion of inclusion that underwrites the concept of power-sharing runs the risk of generating ever more insurgent groups that are not included in any given settlement. As such, the practice of power-sharing may not only induce insurgencies elsewhere, but may also have a significant impact inside a war-torn country. Again, the trajectory of the Congo war and the RCD insurgency is illuminating in this regard inasmuch as the Lusaka ceasefire and the political process it envisioned conveyed a powerful and unanimous 61 Smith, 'La Politique d'engagement', p. 121.
message to some parties to the conflict. While many insurgencies may be prone to defections, it is certainly no coincidence that as soon as the political terms of the Lusaka accords (power-sharing, transitional government) had been established, the defections from the RDC and the proliferation of smaller insurgencies started in earnest, including the RCD-National and the RCD-ML which progressively fragmented even further into factions led by Wamba, Tibasima, Nyamwisi and Lubanga who strove to become rebel leaders in their own right. Given the underlying logic of power-sharing agreements according to which all armed insurgents are to be included in negotiations, these personalities understandably expected to be handled accordingly by the mediators -indeed, this was the very reason they were created for to begin with. By sticking to the principle of inclusive negotiations for the sake of peace, the mediators were confronted with the dilemma to accommodate the demands of ever growing number of factions to be included into the negotiation. In the end, unending discussions were required to decide whether and how the new factions should be included. This was one of the major reasons for the costly delay of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in the course of which the vast majority of an overall death toll of over three million people perished in Eastern Congo -a tragedy which mirrors events in Angola and Rwanda where more people died after the signing of a peace agreement than during the years of war preceding it. 63 Given that only a small minority of embattled governments is confronted by one insurgency movement alone, the proliferation of rebel groups amidst ongoing internal wars may well be an indirect result of looming power-sharing agreements. 
Conclusion
In the early 1990s, there was much talk both inside and outside Africa to the effect that violent takeovers of state power would no longer be permitted. Bodies such as the Organization of African Unity even declared that putsch leaders would no longer be granted outside recognition. No doubt meant to discourage army officers from staging coups d'état, such laudable, if naive discourses presently seem to be outdated to the extent that violence remains an effective instrument to access state power in Africa which is, through the power of facts, accepted or even recognised by Western actors in their hapless attempts to limit the damage.
It is our hypothesis that external efforts to terminate internal warfare may be as much part of the problem as they are part of the solution. Much like emergency assistance and development aid, conflict management is an immensely complex field of political intervention in which moral ambitions alone are not sufficient to create desired outcomes. 64 As we have argued, this is so because the establishment of power-sharing agreements as outsiders' preferred instrument of conflict resolution may unfold potentially dangerous albeit unintended consequences. The danger stems from the fact that power-sharing is almost invariably proposed and often aggressively pushed for by external actors. The institutionalisation of power-sharing creates a degree of predictability for politically ambitious entrepreneurs. Falling short of outright military victory, insurgents can reasonably expect to receive parcels of state power in return for 'peace'. Thus a host of power-sharing agreements in Africa since the early 1990s has set numerous precedents which have created an opportunity structure for violent entrepreneurs elsewhere. One may even conclude that these buy-off tactics contribute to the further militarization of politics in Africa as they do, by definition, marginalize civilian parties. Neglecting this contextual dimension carries the risk of inflated essentialist reporting whereby insurgents are either portrayed as 'freedom fighters' or, more often, as 'greed-driven warlords'. Making sense of contemporary insurgencies therefore begs the consideration of the nexus of internal and external factors and its bearing on the motives, trajectory and outcome of any given insurgency. Perhaps counter-intuitively, attempts at conflict resolution have thus undermined the perspective of conflict prevention. To put it differently: even if power-sharing agreements were to bring peace to any given war-torn country, the practice as such may well spawn outbreaks of insurgent violence elsewhere.
As a result, outside actors keen to resolve violent internal conflicts in Africa face a profound dilemma. To overcome it, two rather bold solutions for outside actors intuitively come to mind: first, let conflicts run their course; second, always provide support (diplomatically, militarily) to incumbent regimes attacked by insurgents. The first one, of course, echoes Luttwak's (in)famous proposal to 'give war a chance' which argues that inept meddling by outsiders has often postponed peace and perpetuated war and human suffering. 65 Although the logic underpinning this argument is somewhat compelling, its caveats are numerous. Most notably it neglects the fact that many 'civil wars' are not -strictly speaking -internal, a point which accounts for their durability and even self-sustaining character (e.g. Angola, Sudan).
such a policy will almost inevitably entrench autocratic and repressive regimes, in turn forestalling any chance of promoting positive political change.
If the hypothesized repercussions of the power-sharing paradigm are to be avoided, or at least to be limited, outside actors need to recognise that the short-term quelling of large-scale violence through power-sharing is not to be confounded with peace. In Sierra Leone as well as Liberia, for example, power-sharing agreements, Lomé and Abuja respectively, resulted in each case in a disastrous 'warlord's peace' that was unsustainable from the start. 66 Given the gross and systematic human rights abuses the rebels committed prior to the peace accords, it was simply irresponsible to presume that they would change their attitudes once occupying government offices.
Since more conflicts will surely erupt and peace settlements in some form or the other will inevitably be brokered, we therefore advance two proposals. First, external brokers need to raise the threshold which grants to insurgents a place at the negotiation table. As such, it is imperative to think beyond violence as the primary measure of political inclusion. Armed groups that prey on local communities and commit serious human rights abuses should be disqualified as negotiating partners. By contrast, some rebels provide some measure of order or even public goods such as security and they should therefore receive a political premium in negotiations. For they come at least close to carry out functions that the government in the making is supposed to fulfil. Needless to say, efforts to promote accountability and legitimacy in the field of conflict resolution will not prevent violent entrepreneurs from conquering state power but it is at least a step to limit the lawlessness and impunity that characterises insurgency-affected countries and which, by and large, often continues to reign long after the official end of the war. One way to promote accountability even during conflicts would be the institutionalisation of criminal investigations to be undertaken by internationally sanctioned juridical bodies (e.g. special courts such as in Sierra Leone, the International Criminal Court in the case of the DR Congo) in the wake or even amidst every internal conflict. 67 Hanging like the sword of Damocles over all warring parties, the threat of criminal investigations may help to restrain the worst abuses. It should send a signal to would-be leaders that raw power is not sufficient to gain international recognition as stakeholders in national power struggles.
For if they are unable or unwilling to live up to certain standards, it is save to assume that they will be unlikely to play a constructive part in the post-conflict period -even more so since the current mechanistic and reflexive use of power-sharing only rarely addresses the root causes of internal wars.
All of this does not release Western actors of the necessity to more generally rethink their policies towards Africa and, at last, to step up efforts to put the rhetoric of conflict prevention into practice. In light of both the poor record of conflict resolution as well as post-conflict peace-building, where significant resources and energy are ineptly used and, perhaps worse, invested only after the fact this should be an urgent task. 68 Should the hypothesis presented in this paper be valid, power-sharing agreements are not the place to start. There is a need to 'bring democracy back in' or at least a framework for mutually acceptable ways to access power. Governments and civilian opposition parties should get a clear credit for respecting accepted rules and
